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TAX-EXEMPT INTEREST OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
A STUDY IN "DISCRIMINATORY" TAXATION
HAROLD WURZELi"
The business of insurance has proven over the years an extremely
difficult subject for Federal taxation. The determination of what
should constitute "income" in the case of insurance companies, com-
bined with differences in the methods of doing business of mutual
and stock companies, has presented the Congress with problems of
unusual complexity."
THE occasion for this statement must have been a rare feast interrupting the
Tax Court's drab routine. It all started with a disintegrating casualty company's
last gasp, challenging the constitutional authority of Congress to saddle mutual
casualty insurance companies (under the 1942 Revenue Act) with a tax on
the gross amount of their investment income and (net) premiums, reduced
only by policyholders' dividends and wholly tax-exempt interest. Maybe the
learned Judges of the Tax Court were carried away by nostalgic memories
of their law school days-in any event, the controversy over a moderate $12,500
deficiency wound up in a free-for-all displaying at least as much youthful gusto
as recondite erudition. The decision, handed down only a few days before
enactment of the Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959,2 regales
the legal historian with cases decided in the year of George Washington's
Farewell Address, and the first opinion in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co.3 is one of the more modem authorities invoked. In the light of these very
recent developments, the yesteryear casebooks on tax law, abounding with
musty controversies of constitutional law, may yet prove to be the most pro-
gressive.
If the small case of a moribund casualty company could arouse a busy Tax
Court to the production of a 52-page booklet, there is no predicting the di-
mensions of cases already in prospect under the 1959 Act, involving a signifi-
cant number of major life insurance companies. The problem which may cause
the legal pundits once again to dust off their 18th-century tomes is briefly
this: Under the 1959 Act, are Life Insurance Companies being taxed on their
tax-exempt interest?
If a price tag may be attached to the controversy over the method of taxing
insurance company investment income, it is, according to Treasury estimates,
tMember of the New York bar; Editor, Research Institute of America, Inc.
1. Penn Mut. Indem. Company, 32 T.C. 653, 654 (1959) (Raum, J.).
2. 73 Stat. 112 (1959), 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-20 (Supp. 1960), amending INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954 §§ 801-13 [hereinafter referred to in discussion as the 1959 Act]. Proposed
Regulations under §§ 801-06 of the Act have been issued. 25 Fed. Reg. 7983 (Aug. 18.
1960).
3. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
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in the neighborhood of $35 million in tax money.4 This estimate, however, is
only a fraction of the total sum involved. First, it is but an anmmal figure and
must, therefore, be multiplied by the number of years during which the prob-
lem remains unsolved. Second, it disregards the fact that the 1959 Act itself,
which increases the tax burden for the companies in general, has commensu-
rately enhanced the attractiveness of securities paying tax-free interest ;G thus,
the present investment in tax exempts may not accurately represent the size
of future investments. The investment managers of leading life insurance
companies are well aware of this development, even if not all tax-exempt
bonds are, on a net-yield basis, in a position to compete with some high-ranking
securities of the taxable kind now available. Paradoxically enough, the Treasury
may in the end lose more by winning than by losing the battle, and quite con-
trary to the companies' dire predictions, 6 the fruits of a Treasury victory are
apt to be reaped by the market in tax-exempt securities.
Two IMMUNITIES OF STATURE
There is nothing in the 1959 Act specifically excluding life insurance com-
panies from the privilege of reducing their tax burden through the ownership
of state or municipal bonds. If a question does arise whether they are being
deprived of a substantial part of that benefit, it arises only indirectly, "by opera-
tion of law," as it were-a law conceived and drafted with care and skill, but
in some of its innovations yet in need of an old-fashioned baptism of fire. More
precisely, it arises through the interplay of two tax immunities of totally different
purposes, though both of high rank and equally impressive tradition:
(1) The exemption from federal income tax of interest on state and
municipal securities, and
(2) the exemption of that portion of a life insurance company's invest-
ment income that state law compels it to set aside each year as a
contribution to the reserve for its policyholders.
For purposes of a succinct identification we shall call the former the interest
exemption, the other the reserve deduction, but bearing in mind that both
terms are concessions to brevity and not intended to prejudge the technical
nature of the benefit as an exemption, exclusion, credit, or deduction.
4. Hearings on HR. 4245 Before the Senate Finance Committee, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 51 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. As much as $100 million is estimated
to be at stake, if the companies' revolt engulfs partially exempt interest and intercorporate
dividends. Ibid.
At the end of 1958, the tax exempt bonds which life insurance companies owned (about
$3.7 billion) amounted to 2.5% of their aggregate assets. This represented a three-fold
increase in amount over ten years. INSTITUTE oF LIFE INsuRANCE, LIFE INSURANcE FACT
BOOK 1959, 69. Moreover, some companies now admit to eight times the average figure
of 2.5% and more. Hearings at 304.
5. See statement by Mr. Clarence J. Myers, chairman and president of the New York
Life Insurance Co., reported in Wall Street journal, January 11, 1960, p. 8, col. 1.




As a matter of protocol, the interest exemption takes precedence. Its seniority
is due not only to greater age, but also to its apparently impregnable position
within the federal income tax structure. It is a cornerstone set in place even
in advance of the sixteenth amendment-a solemn assurance given as far back
as 1910 by prominent senators to a group of apprehensive governors (among
them the later Chief Justice Hughes) .7 It has survived all agitation for its
abolition, a presidential request for its repeal (1938),8 the demise of the
closely related immunity of state-paid salaries, promptly exploited by Congress
(1938-1939), 9 a death warrant endorsed by a Senate Finance Committee in
quest of wartime revenues (1942),10 and an almost unanimously unfavorable,
perennially reaffirmed verdict of tax experts. In the face of an extraordinary
growth in the interest exemption's financial significance, as a result of both
ever-increasing tax rates and a state-local indebtedness now in the neighbor-
hood of $60 billion," this is, by all standards, a combat record of rare distinction.
The site of the interest exemption in the 1954 Internal Revenue Code is
section 103 (a), which reads in part as follows:
(a) General rule. Gross income does not include interest on-
(1) the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession of the
United States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing,
or of the District of Columbia;
(2)
In the form just quoted, however, this provision has not been applied to
life insurance companies. They must include their tax-exempt interest in
their gross income,'2 and may thereafter remove the item from taxation by
availing themselves of whatever compensating deduction or other device the
applicable revenue laws may grant them. But this method of in-and-out is
not designed to affect the exemption as a matter of principle or substance.
It is closely related to the nature of the life insurance business, to the fact
that the companies' entire investment income, taxable and otherwise, plays
7. See Brazer, Interest on State and Local Bonds and the Federal Income Tax, in 1
TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM SUBMITTED TO EOUsE COM ITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 721
(1959) [hereinafter cited as TAX REVIsION COMPENDIUM]; Knollenberg, Book Review of
TAXATION OF GOVERNMENT BONDHOLDERS AND EMPLOYEES: THE IMMUNITY RULE AND
THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT, 49 YALE L.J. 156 (1939).
8. President Roosevelt's message to Congress, April 25, 1938, quoted in 1 MERTENS,
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION § 8.01 n.2 (1956) [hereinafter cited as MERTENS].
9. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939), overruling Collector
v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall) 113 (1870); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, rehearing
denied, 305 U.S. 669 (1938). For congressional action exploiting these cases, see Public
Salary Tax Act of 1939, ch. 59, 53 Stat. 574, amending Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(a).
10. SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1942). Taxation was proposed for
future issues only. It was stricken from the bill after debate on the floor and before the
bill was sent to conference. See 1 MERTENS § 8.17, at 25-26.
11. Hearings at 649.
12. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 14 B.T.A. 200 (1928).
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its part in feeding the reserves for policyholders, in establishing the companies'
solvency to the satisfaction of the State Insurance Commissioner, and in sub-
stantiating the recognition taxwise (through deduction, credit, or exclusion)
of their commitment to the policyholders. As under prior revenue acts and
under the 1939 Code,13 the technical form of asserting what to others is the
exclusion under section 103 (a) is a deduction.'4
The Reserve Deduction
1. The Reserve. An inherently hazardous business and a proverbially con-
servative management add up to the word reserve. The variety of the reserves'
contemplated purposes is infinite. Epidemics, errors of calculation, investment
losses, economic depression with resulting policyholders' demands for cash
(policy loan or surrender value), and many other unpredictable factors want
to be recognized and provided against, some under pressure of state regulation,
some as a matter of option and prudence. The present discussion, however,
will be limited to a single and unique species of reserve, the "life insurance
reserve":
The simplest way in which to define the reserve is to say that it is that
fund, which together with future premiums and interest, will be sufficient
to pay future claims.15
The fundamental role of this reserve is particularly conspicuous in level-
premium life insurance. If the premium were to change every year as the
insured advances in age, life insurance would fail of its purpose. Its cost
would rise to a prohibitive level at the time when it is most needed. For this
eminently practical reason the periodic premium is computed so as to remain
constant throughout the life of the policy-which entails a purposeful "over-
charge" in the early years of the policy and an equalizing "undercharge"
in later years.'0 The fund which accumulates due to the premium overcharge
is available for investment. The "reserve" will therefore be fed by the premium
overcharge plus the yield which the investment of the overcharge produces
year after year. The premium rates which the company deems necessary to
meet future policy liabilities will depend on the interest which it assumes
its invested reserve fund will earn.17
The company's choice of a suitable "assumed interest rate," is quite limited,
however. The lower the rate, the higher the premium; the higher the rate,
the lower the premium. Hence, competition, with its pressure for lower
13. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 201(c), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 868 (1942).
14. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 809(d) (8) (A) (i), as amended, 73 Stat. 121 (1959).
15. HuE3NER & BLACK, LiFE INSURANCE 191 (5th ed. 1958).
16. See id. at 6.
17. See Judge Littleton's explanation of the role of the earnings factor, Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 74 Ct. Cl. 162, 166, 56 F.2d 897, 899 (1932). The term
"interest" should be understood exclusively as an element of calculation-it does not con-
note "interest" in any legal sense.
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premium rates, will prevent a company from selecting an assumed interest
rate which is inordinately lower than its actual investment earnings rate.
Conversely, the State Insurance Commissioner, the guardian of the companies'
solvency, will furnish the ceiling. He will not tolerate an assumed interest
rate of 8 per cent if the company can barely expect to earn 4 per cent. In
practice, the companies have been more conservative than the Commissioners 18
-which, it is to be remembered, spells higher premiums, a speedier build-up
of the reserve through those higher premiums, with less help from investment
earnings, and in pleasant addition, a wider margin of profits consisting of the
excess of actual over assumed earnings on investments.
2. The Deduction. Setting aside funds now, in order to provide against
liabilities to be discharged at an unknown time in the future has seldom
appealed to Congress in its capacity as the purveyor of federal revenues.
Principles, however, are pliable enough to yield to practicalities, if the prac-
ticalities, as in the case of the life insurance reserve, are sufficiently per-
suasive.
In the halcyon days of little or no taxation, companies had contracted to
insure policyholders for an immutable premium, calculated on the basis of an
assumed interest yield from investments. If the investment yield allocated to
build up reserves had been taxed, and thereby reduced, the companies would
have been compelled to meet this deficiency by dipping into their own funds,
creating a risk of insolvency for those companies with limited free resources.
Moreover, taxation of the interest component would have necessitated higher
premium rates for future policies, subject to fluctuation with each change in
the tax rate.19 High premiums, and particularly premiums changing with the
tax-rate schedule, would tend to deter the public from buying insurance, at
least from United States companies, and once the decline of policy purchases
sets in, the very essence of life insurance, the law of average based on the
participation of the largest possible number, would be in jeopardy.20
18. The Commissioners usually accept a rate of 334% when checking on a company's
solvency; stock companies generally use an assumed rate of 3% and mutuals 2Y2% or
less (with equalization through "dividends"). HUEBNER & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 15,
at 192. The required change in mortality table assumptions caused by the new 1958 CSO
table "may lead some companies to a re-examination of interest rate assumptions." Stern-
hell, The Commissioners 1958 Standard Ordinary Mortality Table, 14 C.L.U. JOURNAL
255, 269 (1960).
19. In addition, the bookkeeping problems necessitated by the creation of separate
reserve funds, one of which has a taxable interest component and the other of which does
not, stagger the imagination.
20. This does not imply that the annual increment to the reserve from investment
income must forever remain unmolested by the tax collector on a current basis. Proposals
to the contrary have again been submitted. See, e.g., Lent, The Tax Treatment of Life
Insurance, 3 TAX REvISON COMPENDIUIM 1995, 2011. But the removal of the present tax
shelter would have to affect the policyholder more directly than through interference with
the formation of the policy reserve or with the computation or long-term consistency of the
premium.
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For these reasons, Congress adopted a hands-off policy, manifested by a
reserve deduction. Wrhile computation of the deduction has varied over the
decades, its purpose has always been to immunize from tax that portion of
the companies' investment income that was properly allocable to the policy-
holders' reserve.
From 1921 to 1941 Congress itself fixed 4 per cent 21 of the reserve fund
required by state law as the amount of investment income which would ordi-
narily be immune from tax.w2 The 4 per cent deduction reduced the companies'
contribution to the Treasury to a minimum, particularly as their actual invest-
ment income dropped to a level of about 3% per cent. Under wartime con-
ditions this was no creditable performance. Consequently, in 1942 a new
system was introduced, this time adapting the reserve deduction to the average
experience of the entire industry and expressing it, not in terms of a percentage
of the reserve funds, but rather as a percentage of (taxable) net income. It
was the main ingredient of the "reserve and other policy liability credit," de-
fined as an amount computed by multiplying the (normal-tax and surtax) net
income by a figure to be determined and proclaimed by the Secretary of the
Treasury, according to a statutory formula, for each taxable year.23
The formula, during its first few years, worked to almost everybody's
satisfaction. From 1942 to 1946 it produced a percentage figure ranging from
91.98 to 95.95, leaving only from 8.02 to 4.05 per cent of the (taxable) net
investment income to be taxed. Then the computer started sputtering and
21. After 1932, the rate was reduced to 34% if the company's "assumed" interest
rate dropped below 4%. See Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 203 (a) (2), 47 Stat. 223-25.
See 8 MERTENS §§ 44.25 n.24, 44.28 n.74 (1942 ed.).
22. During this period, the provisions regarding taxation of life insurance companies
were: Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §§ 242-45, 42 Stat. 261-62; Revenue Act of 1924, ch.
234, §§ 242-45, 43 Stat. 288-90; Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 242-45, 44 Stat. 47-48;
Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, §§ 201-03, 45 Stat. 842-44; Revenue Act of 1932,
ch. 209, §§ 201-03, 47 Stat. 223-25; Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 227, §§ 201-03, 48 Stat. 731-
33; Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, §§ 201-03, 49 Stat. 1648-1756; Revenue Act of 1938,
ch. 289, §§ 201-03, 52 Stat. 522-24; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 201-03.
There was a reserve deduction also under earlier legislation, but its purpose was
essentially different. It was aimed at eliminating "unearned" premiums at a time when
premiums collected were among the main items of gross income and the tax base was not
restricted, as it was under the 1921 and subsequent acts, to investment income. 8 MERTENs
§§ 44.27, -.28. It should be noted that the 1959 Act, in a measure, reverts to the pre-1921
method by allowing underwriting gains and losses to affect the tax result. INT. REv. CoDE
oF 1954, §§ 809-12, as amended, 73 Stat. 121-27 (1959) (so-called phase two of the tax
computation). Yet it retains what characterized the tax treatment since 1921, investment
income as a separate component of the tax base.
23. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 202(b), as amended, ch. 619, 56 Stat. 870 (1942). In
its essence, the statutory formula reflected the ratio of a modified reserve deduction (means
of the reserves times a specified reserve earnings rate) to net income before deduction
of tax-exempt interest, all on a nationwide basis. The resulting percentage figure was
then applied by the taxpayer to its individual (taxable) net income (that is, after deduc-
tion of tax-exempt interest), and so applied was the credit allowed to escape taxation.
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came up with embarrassing figures: 100.66 per cent for 1947 and 102.43 per
cent for 1948.24 A change of formula was indicated and accomplished by the
Revenue Act of 1950. The new formula resulted in a more readily justifiable
93.55 per cent for 1949 2r and 90.63 per cent for 1950,26 but still a somewhat
ample shelter. In 1951 the reserve deduction dropped to the equivalent of
about 87 per cent when, in lieu of the "reserve and other policy liability
credit," a flat tax rate of 334 per cent was applied to the first $200,000 and
6Y2 per cent to any excess of (adjusted) normal-tax net income.2 7 For post-
1954 years the 1954 Code reverted to the 1942 formula (revised edition) .28
Yet when the discredited computer attempted to rehabilitate itself by sug-
gesting 82.38 per cent as appropriate for 1955,29 it was, once again, the
"wrong" figure, though this time the error was in the opposite direction. A
tidal wave of legislation corrected the indiscretion.3" It reinstated for 1955-
1957 the prior system of applying the same tax rates as apply to ordinary
corporations and taking into account the required additions to reserve by way
of a reserve deduction. The deduction rate was 87% per cent of net investment
income (except the portion allocable to nonlife reserves) on the first $1
million and 85 per cent beyond that limit.3 ' A sulky computer went into
seclusion for 1956, ineffectively soliloquizing that for 1957 the proper figure
would have been 77.66 per cent.32
3. The 1959 Act. Congress, understandably impatient with the makeshift
and stopgap legislation of recent years, adopted a new approach to the reserve
deduction in drafting the 1959 Act. It rejected a formula system based on
a nationwide average, which penalizes or rewards individual companies de-
pending on their deviation from the norm. It found equally unacceptable the
24. For the yearly percentages, see T.D. 5188, 1942-2 Cum. BULL. 151; T.D. 5328,
1944 Cum. BULL. 333; T.D. 5427, 1945 Crm. BULL. 243; T.D. 5486, 1946-1 Cum. BULL.
127; T.D. 5547, 1946-2 Cum. BULL. 92; T.D. 5595, 1947-2 Cum. BULL. 96; T.D. 5689,
1949-1 Cum. BuLL. 119.
25. T.D. 5813, 1950-2 Cum. BULL. 65. The change substituted the average rate of
interest assumed by the companies for the previous "reserve earnings rate," which had
been inflated by a generous admixture (65%) of a 31/4 percentage as assumed interest.
26. T.D. 5831, 1951-1 Cum. BULL. 56.
27. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 201(a) (1), 203(A), as amended, ch. 521, 65 Stat. 507
(1951), ch. 592, 66 Stat. 444 (1952), ch. 512, 67 Stat. 616 (1953) ; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 802(b). Adjusted normal-tax net income meant essentially (taxable) net investment
income, with some adjustments not material in the present connection.
28. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 802(a). See for the intention of continuity, S. REp.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 409 (1954).
29. T.D. 6146, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 280.
30. Life Insurance Co. Tax Act for 1955, ch. 83, 70 Stat. 36 (1956), amending INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 802(a), extended by ch. 696, 70 Stat. 633 (1956), and P.L. 85-345,
72 Stat. 36 (1958). This legislation expanded the tax base (investment income) to cover
royalties, not only rents, income from entering into, altering, or terminating lease or
mortgage agreements, income derived from a business other than insurance.
31. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 804(a), as amended, ch. 83, 70 Stat. 36 (1956).
32. T.D. 6250, 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 366.
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use of the individual company's assumed interest rate, which could be adjusted
to suit its tax convenience. Instead, it adopted a new approach.a3 The ap-
plicable interest rate is now the average interest earned (not assumed) by
the individual company in the current and four prior taxable years on its
investment assets, but in no event is the rate to exceed the current earnings
rate.3 4 Congress so decided on the somewhat optimistic theory "that the
competitive pressures within the industry will in the long run force various
companies to build into their price structure for their policies a credit for
interest on something like this basis."35 Multiplied by presently existing
reserves, however, the applicable average or current interest rate would tend
to give a deduction substantially larger than the amount which companies
actually credit to the policy reserve, for the annual addition to reserves is
calculated by multiplying the reserve by an "assumed" interest rate which is
appreciably lower than the rate earned by the company. The disparity between
the actual credit and the allowed deduction is aggravated by the speedy and
insurancewise wholesome buildup of reserves which a low assumed interest
rate produces. To adjust for this "temporary" disparity, the act adopts a "rule
of thumb" which for tax purposes reduces the reserve by ten per cent for
every one per cent by which the applicable earnings rate exceeds the "assumed"
rate.3
6
The reserves so adjusted, when multiplied by the applicable earnings rate,
represent the "policy and other contract liability requirements." These policy
requirements are then divided by net investment income (including tax-
exempt interest), called the "investment yield," and this step produces the
percentage of every item of investment yield that is excluded from the com-
33. The 1959 Act introduces a three-phase procedure for the taxation of life insurance
companies.
The present discussion is limited to the interrelation of interest exemption and reserve
deduction (exclusion), a problem fraught with both real and false issues of constitutional
law. This limitation, imposed by the exigencies of legal analysis, eliminates (but is not
intended to belittle) such financially equally important items as partially exempt interest
and intercorporate dividends, not to mention such collateral questions as the nature of a
market discount on a life insurance company's purchase of municipals. See Treas.
Release TIR-230, May 18, 1960; Rev. Rul. 60-210, 1960 INT. REv. BULL. No. 22, at 10.
What is more, it permits the treatment to concentrate on investment income (phase one),
which raises the problem of interrelation directly and squarely, and thereby to leave
undecided the controversial question whether the same problem is also inherent in phases
two (gain and loss from operations) and three (distributions to shareholders of stock
companies). For the latter question, see the summary of an address by Mr. Devereaux
F. McClatchey, general counsel of the National Association of Life Companies, to the
NALC 1960 Convention, in The National Underwriter, July 30, 1960, p. 11. The address
deals with "Tax Exempt Interest and Intercorporate Dividends under the 1959 Life In-
surance Company Income Tax."
34. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 805, as amended, 73 Stat. 118 (1959).
35. S. REP. No. 291, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1959).
36. See id. at 16. For a criticism of the "rule of thumb," see Roy E. Moor, Tax Treat-
ment of Insurance Companies, 3 TAx REvisiox COmPENDIUm 1983, 1993.
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pany's income.37 This exclusion is the present-day substitute for the former
reserve deduction.
CHANGING PATTERNS OF COEXISTENCE
The 1959 Act preserves, in their substance, both immunities, the interest
exemption and the reserve deduction, and its prenatal history shows that this
continuity is intended and deliberate.38 Each of the two inmunities has its
very own raison d'itre. They have in common an unusual vitality, a well-
established tradition. Their purposes, however, are so disparate and incom-
parable, their functions so unrelated to each other, that when the twain meet
in the hands of the same taxpayer, neither adds to, or detracts from, the
"equity" of the other.
It is appropriate to bear this point in mind, because "equities" have an un-
controllable way of intruding upon our judgment when tax benefits, however
meritorious and unquestionable if taken separately, are bunched into a cumu-
lative benefit which offends our sense of balance.39 But the "visceral" approach
to the bunching is no reliable tool in determining when the cumulative effect
of multiple tax benefits constitutes the kind of "duplication" to which an
objection may properly be taken. Cumulative effect of tax benefits is not in-
herently, or by force of logic, duplication of tax benefits. "Duplication" pre-
supposes a double benefit granted to the same item. Whether or not there is
such an identity is primarily a matter of policy and statutory law. Thus, by
37. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 804(a) (1), as amended, 73 Stat. 115 (1959).
38. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire whether Congress's motive was belief in
the intrinsic merits of both immunities, an assumption that the Constitution so required, or
simply political expediency. It is regrettable, however, that as terminology-conscious a
group as the legal profession has been content to characterize deductions approved by
Congress in the exercise of its legislative functions as matters of "grace." There is an
endless variety of conceivable motives for a member of Congress to approve of or consent
to a deduction-from a lofty dictate of conscience, sense of duty, economic wisdom, down
to the realistic exigencies of party politics. In any event, the exercise of a mystical
power to dispense "grace" is probably about the last thing of which he would care to
be accused.
39. The Supreme Court itself occasionally succumbs to this human fraility. In United
States v. Benedict, 338 U.S. 692 (1950), reversing 112 Ct. Cl. 550, 81 F. Supp. 717 (1949),
it referred (by way of an illustration close to the facts of the case) to a trust which
realized a long-term capital gain of $60,000 and made a charitable contribution of $30,000.
Since the charitable deduction from gross income was allowed for any amount of gross
income contributed to charity ($30,000) and, in computing net income only 50% of the
long-term capital gain was to be taken into account ($30,000), the cumulative effect of
these two entirely unrelated benefits would be a net income of zero, according to ac-
cepted canons of statutory interpretation. This was to much, or rather too little, for
the Supreme Court to accept. It proceeded to give "gross income" a meaning which re-
duced it to the amount to be taken into account in computing net income, so that $15,000
remained as a tax base.
The result found its way into the Code of 1954, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 642(c).
H.R. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., now awaiting its revival, would yield to an even less
liberal treatment.
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giving the taxpayer an optional standard deduction, the law may define the
various items which it intends to take into account, and taking a separate
deduction for any such item, in addition to the standard deduction, will, by
definition only, create a duplication, a double benefit for the same item.
Similarly, the law may define what it means by the reserve deduction, and
if by that definition it would deduct from taxable income an amount which
it has never charged to the taxpayer in the first place, it may call for an
adjustment to eliminate the unintended duplication, a double benefit for the
identical item. In both cases, however, the legislator must make sure that
he is acting within his powers. Even though he regards benefits as duplicating
each other, because making a double allowance for the same item, he may not
remove the duplication by removing a benefit which is beyond his jurisdiction.
He is (arbitrariness aside) not accountable to anybody in deciding what con-
stitutes a duplication, but he is accountable for the choice of his remedies to
eliminate the duplication. In this respect he has not always succeeded in re-
maining entirely above reproach.
On the premise that, in one form or another, the two benefits, interest
exemption and reserve deduction, must be joined, there is but a limited number
of combinations and permutations available, even when treating them as
equals rather than weighing them on the scales of either their political or
economic importance. Prior to the 1959 Act three combinations have emerged,
each of which has governed a substantial number of years within the last
four decades. They may be illustrated by a simple set of facts.
Assume a net investment income of $100-after deductible investment ex-
penses, but before eliminating tax-exempt interest. Wholly tax-exempt inter-
est amounts to $20, and the reserve deduction from investment income to $70.
What is the company's taxable income?
Pattern A Pattern B Pattern C
$100 $100 $100
less 20 20 20
$80 $80 $80
less 50 (=70-20) 70 56 [=70-(20/100 X 70)]
Taxable $30 $ 10 $24
income
In terms of taxable income, we may call Pattern A the Maximum, Pattern
B the Minimum, Pattern C the Medium solution.
Pattern A (Maximum)
Pattern A, resulting in the maximum tax, is based on a merger of the two
benefits. In common with the other two pre-1959 patterns, it treats the interest
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exemption as paramount. There is nothing taken away from the $20 exemption
of interest on state or municipal bonds.
The reserve deduction of $70, however, may not be taken in full under this
pattern. It is considered to such an extent a duplication of the interest ex-
emption that it must be reduced, dollar for dollar, by the amount of that
exemption. In other words, to the extent the company's earnings are anyhow
tax-free, there is no need for a reserve deduction. Instead of $70 only $70
minus $20 may be claimed as reserve deduction. The taxable income is there-
fore reduced from $80 to $30. The same amount-$30--would be the taxable
income of a taxpayer having no tax-exempt interest and being therefore
entitled to the full $70 reserve deduction from $100.
This is the tax equity concept of the Revenue Act of 1921.40 It found the
support of many life insurance companies, the Court of Claims, 4' and Justices
Brandeis, Holmes, and Stone. In National Life Ins. Co. v. United States,42
however, a majority of the Supreme Court felt that "Congress had no power
purposely and directly to tax state obligations by refusing to their owners
deductions allowed to others." Assisted by the customary saving clause, the
Supreme Court excised only that part of the 1921 Revenue Act that limited
the reserve deduction to the excess of 4 per cent of the yearly mean of the
company's reserve funds over wholly exempt interest. As a result, the Act
bad to be given effect as though the reserve deduction were 4 per cent of
reserves for every life insurance company, regardless of any (additional) ex-
emption of tax-free interest. As far as state obligations were concerned (fed-
eral government obligations were likewise involved), the decision was, of
course, predicated on the doctrine of intergovernmental immunities. Its
reasoning, as expressed in Justice McReynolds' opinion, is inspired principally
by the net effect that, with all its tax-exempt interest, the company would
have had to pay as much income tax as a company without any tax-exempt
interest. Considering that the company had a substantial amount of tax-free
interest, this could only mean that the truly taxable income (i.e., after elimi-
nating the exempt interest) was encumbered with a heavier tax burden than in
the hands of a company having no tax-exempt income-a discriminatory
penalty for owning tax-exempt securities.
Justice Brandeis (joined by Justices Stone and Holmes) pointed out that
the company had been given its full exemption for the tax-free interest. It
was, in his opinion, not being discriminated against, since discrimination
means different treatment for taxpayers in like circumstances, but not like
treatment for taxpayers in unlike circumstances.4 3  (Justice McReynolds,
40. Ch. 136, § 245, 42 Stat. 261, defines "net income" of a life insurance company as
gross income less (among other items) : (1) interest on tax-exempt securities, (2) any
excess of 4 per cent of the mean of the reserve funds required by law over the interest
specified in (1).
41. National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 63 Ct. Cl. 256 (1927), rei'd, 277 U.S.
508 (1928).
42. 277 U.S. 508, 522 (1928).
43. Id. at 530.
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sotto voice: ". . . specious, but unsound"). 44 The constitutional exemption
does not mean to guarantee that the holder of tax-exempt securities must in
all tax respects be better off than the taxpayer holding no such securities.
Yet even assuming that the abatement of the 4 per cent reserve deduction by
tax-exempt interest is invalid, the remedy is not simply to strike the abatement.
Congress might have wished to strike the entire reserve deduction.
justice Stone, dissenting (joined by Justices Brandeis and Holmes), ad-
dressed himself to the doctrine of intergovernmental immunities in the light
of his relativity theory. To him, the doctrine did not require Congress to grant
benefits or immunities to a taxpayer only on condition that it extend the same
benefits to holders of exempt securities in addition to their exemption. 4
Instead of narrowing the exemption, the majority tended to expand it by
reading into it an affirmative claim to favors.
Pattern B (Minimum)
Pattern B recognizes no problem of duplication or overlap. If a company
holds exempt bonds, it is entitled to the interest exemption. If it qualifies
as a "life insurance company" in the technical sense, it is entitled to the reserve
deduction. If it happens to fall into both classes, it is entitled to both benefits,
cumulatively, even if they should add up to more than the taxpayer's total
income.
National Life, in effect, so modified the 1921 Act and with a national
economy heading toward unemployment and misery of catastrophic propor-
tions, Congress had some more pressing problems to solve than to concern
itself with the reserve deduction for life insurance companies-a question
which would anyhow become academic with the expected general drop in
earnings and, if approached with an excess of zeal, might engulf an entire
basic industry in insolvency.
Thus, from National Life down to the most critical days of World War II,
every revenue act left the Minimum solution untouched.
Pattern C (Medium)
If the term "medium" has the pleasurable connotation of a peaceful compro-
mise on which all men of good will may readily agree, it is in the present
connection ill-chosen. Pattern C, the most embattled of the three approaches,
is the pattern over which battle is, once again, about to be joined. The prin-
cipal reason for its provocative role is its chameleonic versatility. There is but
one pattern C, if the criterion.is the arithmetical result, but there are three,
if it is the structure and even more if it is the reasoning that counts. Their
underlying theme is the same-some sort of apportionment leading up to the
same figure (24, in our example)-but it is a theme con variazioni. Each
of these variations must be judged on its own merits. Their common theme
44. Id. at 520.
45. Id. at 537.
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-apportionment-neither saves nor condemns them. It is, therefore, desirable
to expose them to at least a summary synopsis at this point.
Pattern C(1), the variation described above, allows for the interest ex-
emption first and in full. $100 -$20 = $80. The reserve deduction comes
next, and that in part only. The ordinary deduction of $70 is reduced by an
amount which bears to $70 the same ratio as the tax exempt interest ($20)
bears to the entire investment yield ($100), that is, net investment income
including tax-exempt interest. 20/100 of $70 being $14, the reserve deduction
is reduced to $70 minus $14, or $56.
What is deemed to justify this reduction is the tax-free content of the credit
to the reserves. The credit is being subjected to an assay. On the theory
(equitable, to be sure, but nevertheless fictional) that the credit has propor-
tionately the same components as its source (the investment income), 20 per
cent of that credit is labeled "tax-free interest" and disqualified for the reserve
deduction by reason of its prior elimination under the fully recognized interest
exemption. The result is $100 less ($20 plus $56), or $24.45a
Pattern C(2) likewise bows first to the untouchable exemption of interest.
The step from $100 to $80 is still de rigifeur. Ordinarily, the reserve require-
ment would absorb 70 per cent ($70 of out $100) of net investment income
(taxable or otherwise). But since there is no need for permitting a 70 per cent
deduction for income which has already been removed from the collector's
reach on grounds beyond challenge, the 70 per cent is applied only to the
otherwise taxable portion of the income. 70 per cent of $80 being $56, the
result again is $100 less ($20 plus $56), or $24.45b
Pattern C(3) is the variation with a distinct preference for the unorthodox.
Life insurance companies can survive without investing in tax-exempts. But
they cannot continue their past and present way of computing their premiums
without an assurance that the reserve requirements to be satisfied out of invest-
ment income are taxwise not "negotiable." Hence, the reserve deduction comes
first and in full-all constitutional decorum notwithstanding. The $70 reserve
deduction lowers taxable income from $100 to $30. The legislator, however,
may now have reason to tread with utmost caution. If he wishes to give
tax-exempt interest its full due, he may feel that to the extent of 70 per cent
of the interest the states have been given complete satisfaction, though under
a different classification. Therefore, all that is required to satisfy a full 100 per
cent exemption is a deduction of the remaining 30 per cent of the interest.
45a. Another version of the same method is to reduce $70 by an amount which bears to
the tax-exempt interest ($20) the same ratio as the reserve deduction ($70) bears to the
investment yield ($100). 70/100 X $20=$14.
45b. As in Pattern C(1), the principle of Pattern C(2) may be given a different ex-
pression of similar rationale. Determine the ratio of the taxable portion to the total of the
investment income. $100 less $20=$80: 100=80%. 80% of $70 is the reserve deduction
($56) which reduces the taxable portion ($80) to the amount representing the company's
taxable income. In this manner the nontaxable as well as the taxable portion of the earn-
ings on the reserve is forced to carry its load of the credit to the policyholders.
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Thus, deduct from $30 an amount equal to 30 per cent of $20, or $6-and, once
again, the result is $24.
Of these three variations of Pattern C, all (at one time or another) have
appeared on the federal scene. The second variation, although condemned by
many companies as discriminatory,46 governed (either explicitly or in practical
effect) for some 16 years (1942-1957) for federal income tax purposes. 47
With a generous reserve deduction level of 85 to more than 100 per cent of
taxable net income, however, its operation under the 1942 formula and its stop-
gap successors was of so negligible effect that it aroused at that time no re-
sistance.48 The third variation, embodied in the 1959 Act, still is awaiting
its day in court.
The validity of variations one and two has been tested, however, in cases
involving state property taxation. A few years before National Life, a Michi-
gan property tax law was submitted for examination by that state's courts in
Packard Motor Car Co. v. City of Detroit, and was found wanting.40 The
statute purported to tax "credits" (read: bonds, claims, certificates of indebted-
ness) less debts owed, but if the taxpayer owned "credits" exempt from tax,
debts were deductible only in the same proportion as taxable "credits" bore
to total "credits." The taxpayer had total "credits" of $18 million, of which
$12 million were exempt. Its debt amounted to $9 million. If $12 million
could be entirely eliminated as exempt, there would be a debt of $9 million
against taxable assets of $6 million, hence no tax. The law called for ap-
portionment. Only 6/18ths of the debt was deductible if only 6/18ths of the
credits was taxable. On this theory $3 million remained taxable. The appor-
tionment theory was held erroneous, and the law void. "In laying a tax on
property, tax exempt credits must be treated as nonexistent. The legislature
may not make use of, or permit consideration to be taken of, tax exempt
credits as a factor in determining taxes to be paid by holders thereof." 0
46. Hearings on H.R. 4245 before Senate Finance Committee, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
at 310-11 (1959).
47. Omitting factors which are of no relevance to our problem, the 1942 formula
is, in essence, a fraction-the numerator of which is adjusted reserves times earnings rate
(the $70 reserve requirement) and the denominator of which is net income before re-
duction of tax exempt interest (the $100 figure in our example). Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
§ 202(b) (1), as amended, [Revenue Act of 1942] ch. 619, § 163, 56 Stat. 870 (1942).
Elimination of duplicate deductions was stated as a specific reason for enacting the
formula. See H.R. RES. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1942) ("a formula which
has the effect of ...eliminating the double deduction of tax exempt interest").
48. According to a statement by Mr. Stanford Z. Rothschild, president of the Sun
Life Insurance Co. of America, Hearings at 695, the absence of opposition is attributable
to the fact that the 1942 formula took into account the industry's average holdings of
exempt securities, favoring in effect the companies with above-average amounts of tax-
free interest (i.e. those otherwise most likely to complain) and placing at a disadvantage
the companies with less than average tax-exempt interest.
49. 232 Mich. 245, 205 N.W. 106 (1925) ; Packard Motor Car Co. v. City of Detroit,
232 Mich. 250, 205 N.W. 108 (1925).
50. 232 Mich. at 247; 205 N.W. at 107.
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Clearly, this decision of a state court condemns our variation (1) of Pattern
C, because what the law required was to reduce our $70 by so much of itself
as exempt "credits" bore to total "credits," i.e., 20/100. Needless to add, this
ruling met with the wholehearted approval of the majority in National Life.51
In the second case testing Pattern C, Missouri ex rel. Missouri Ins. Co. v.
Gehner,52 a Missouri state law imposed a property tax on the net value of all
property of insurance companies in excess of the legally required reserve. The
Missouri Insurance Company had $142,000 in real property and $448,000 in
personal property of which $94,000 were exempt federal government bonds.
Its legally required reserve was $333,000. The company deducted from
$448,000 both the $94,000 United States bonds and the full reserve and claims
liability of $333,000, a total of $427,000, and arrived at a taxable personal
property of $21,000.
The Missouri Supreme Court took exception to this computation.53 It re-
quired the company to add up all taxable property, real and personal, and to
divide the sum ($496,000) by its total assets, including the nontaxable $94,000
in United States bonds ($590,000). The percentage so determined (84 per
cent) was then to be applied to the reserves and claims ($333,000), and only
the resulting figure ($280,000) was to be deducted from the taxable personal
property. So computed, the taxable personal property was $74,000, instead
of $21,000.
A majority of the United States Supreme Court held this state law con-
struction to violate the rule of National Life:
[A] State may not subject one to a greater burden upon his taxable
property merely because he owns tax-exempt government securities.
Neither ingenuity in calculation nor form of words in state enactments
can deprive the owner of the tax exemption established for the benefit
of the United States. [Citing National Life and cases cited in McCulloch
v. Maryland.]
The section discloses a purpose as a general rule to omit from taxation
sufficient assets of the insurance companies to cover their legal reserve
and unpaid policy claims. It would be competent for the State to permit
a less reduction or none at all. But where as in this case the ownership
of the United States bonds is made the basis of denying the full exemption
which is accorded to those who own no such bonds this amounts to an
infringement of the guaranteed freedom from taxation. It is clear that
the value of appellant's government bonds was not disregarded in making
up the estimate of taxable net values. That is in violation of the estab-
lished rule.54
Chief Justice Hughes concurred on the basis of National Life.
Justice Stone (joined by Justices Brandeis and Holmes) did not revert to
his dissent in National Life. He felt that the majority was in error even if
51. 277 U.S. 508, 520 (1928).
52. 281 U.S. 313 (1930).
53. 322 Mo. 339, 15 S.W.2d 334 (1929).
54. 281 U.S. at 321.
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National Life were conceded to be correctly decided. "The immunity of gov-
ernment bonds from taxation does not carry with it immunity from liability
for debts." 55 Liabilities must, therefore, be deducted from all assets, including
exempt bonds, "or, what comes to the same thing, by deducting from taxable
assets their proportionate share of the burden of policy liabilities .... In fact
and in law tax-exempt securities constitute a part of the corporate reservoir
of capital, all of which without distinction may be drawn on for the payment
of obligations."5 6
The Missouri case differs, of course, in a number of respects from the issue
here under discussion. It must be translated from property to income, from state
to federal taxation, and from federal to state or local bonds. Its essence, how-
ever, clearly adopts the minimum solution of Pattern B as the proper pattern
of coexistence. Its particular significance lies in the conclusion most heartening
to the companies that the minor infraction by apportionment still remains an
infraction in the eyes of the Supreme Court. The rejected pattern of coex-
istence was, it should be noted, the property-tax counterpart of the second
variation of pattern C, the variation employed by the federal statute from
1942-1957. 57
COEXISTENCE UNDER THE 1959 ACT
The House Method of Avoiding Duplication
With a retrospective glance at a sixteen-year record of avoided duplication,
introduced with the industry's advice and consent, the House had no reason
to be tentative about the interplay of the two immunities, when it passed
H.R. 4245 on February 18, 1959.
Taxable Investment Income was defined as net investment income minus
the "policy and other contract liability deduction," which we have called the
"reserve deduction," since its primary component is the deduction for the
earnings attributable to the (adjusted) life insurance reserves.58 In reducing
investment income (which included tax-exempt interest) from gross to net,
full deduction was granted for wholly tax-exempt interest.59 However, unless
corrected, the reserve deduction would reflect the investment earnings in their
entirety, regardless of taxability. Hence an "adjustment to prevent double
deductions" was required.60
In its essence,61 the adjustment called for an "adding back" of the same
proportion of the wholly tax-exempt interest as the reserve deduction ( before
55. Id. at 324.
56. Id. at 323-24.
57. See text at note 47 supra.
58. H.R. 4245, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 805 (a) (1959).
59. Id., §804.
60. Id., § 805(c).
61. Omitting such other elements as partially exempt interest, dividends received,
investment yield on pension plan reserves, the small business deduction, which all enter




this adjustment) was of the "investment yield," that is, of the net investment
income before deducting tax-exempt interest. Thus, if a company is required
to add to reserves an amount equal to 70 per cent of its net investment
income (before deducting tax-exempt interest) ,62 and the net investment in-
come of $100 includes $20 wholly tax-exempt interest, the reserve deduction
was to be not $70, but $70 minus seven-tenths of $20 ($14), or $56, which
is equal to the full 70 per cent on the taxable part of the income, $80. This
method adopts the principle of Pattern C, first variation.
The possibility that this curtailment of the reserve deduction by reason of
a company's investment in tax-exempt securities might trespass into a politi-
cally sensitive area did occur to the draftsmen, but it must have been considered
as too farfetched to be worthy of more than a passing remark for the benefit
of unduly apprehensive members of Congress. "This does not, however,




The companies took a less detached view of the proposed adjustment, the
intensity of their objections varying presumably in degree with the extent of
their present and contemplated investment in tax-exempt securities. To them,
there was not only a deviation from the existing law, but an ominous invasion
of the sanctuary of tax-free interest, which well might end in its complete
destruction, a collateral attack only a trifle milder and more subtle than the
abomination perpetrated by the 1921 Revenue Act and rightly scrapped by
an indignant majority of the Supreme Court as rank discrimination.6 4 The
spectre of a deliberate reversion to the lawlessness of the early twenties set in
motion an impressive pilgrimage to Washington.
It seems to be in the nature of legislative hearings that even grievances of
a primarily legal and technical nature must be pleaded with all the fervor of
campaign oratory. In this case, the "widows and orphans,"6 5 the "over 100
million small savers," 66 questionable analogies with other groups of taxpayers,
and similar irrelevancies have tended to obscure the true merits of an objection
which is difficult enough to evaluate without the benefit of rhetorical sur-
plusage.
A noticeably appreciative and sympathetic Finance Committee, eager to be
enlightened by both sides on a troublesome point of constitutional law (the
policy of retaining, on principle, both the reserve deduction and the exemption
of interest on municipals was at no time at issue), was left without the founda-
62. For purposes of simplified illustration the 70-per cent figure is frequently used
in this discussion, as it has been in the hearings before the Senate Finance Committee,
although it is but a rough approximation of the average.
63. H.R. RE:a. No. 34, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1959).
64. National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, supra note 41.
65. Hearings at 317.
66. Id. at 307.
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tion on which to base an informed legal judgment of its own. Much was said
about the threatening collapse of the market in municipals and its effect on
state finances, or about past practice under the 1942 and subsequent formulae,
when the reserve deduction was so high and the investment yield so low that
the tax was minimal or (as in 1947 and 1948) nonexistent. Little or nothing,
however, was heard about the present authority of Supreme Court cases
handed down some 30 years ago when vested rights commanded a different
kind of respect; or about changed judicial thinking in matters of intergovern-
mental immunities; or about the power of Congress to classify taxpayers in
accordance with the peculiar characteristics of their economic functions.
The unfortunate result was a nebulous compromise in an otherwise remark-
ably thorough, constructive, and comprehensive piece of legislation-an oracle
in the place of an order.
Suum Cuique or Justice With Malice Aforethought-The Senate Amendment
It was no easy drafting assignment to cast the Finance Committee's nice
balance of firmness and fairness into a legal mold equipped to pass the acid
test of judicial proceedings. The draftsmen rose to the occasion.
Here were lachrymose plaints voiced on behalf of poor widows and orphans
and over 100 million small savers, and with understandable pride did the
companies point out that "close to $1 billion of Policyholders' Funds are in-
vested in turnpike and toll road bonds and in financing educational facilities,
primarily through state and municipal bonds. . . ."" Could there be anything
more gratifying to the companies than to have their wards recognized, officially
and de jure, as the proper parties in interest? And would not such recognition
automatically solve in the most convincing and plausible manner the problem
of the tax-exempt interest, since the exemption naturally belongs to those
recognized as being entitled to the interest?
Exit the old-fashioned concept of a reserve deduction. Instead, the company
will divide its net investment "yield" (which term always means "including
tax-exempt interest") into two neatly separated shares. One, now boldly called
"the policyholders' share," is outside the company's taxable investment income.
It is excluded. The other is the company's own share, the only portion for
which it must account to the tax collector.68
Call it a magician's trick, or a stroke of genius-it is as stunningly plain a
solution as Columbus' fabled way of making an egg stand up, simply by crush-
67. INSTITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 1959 at 69. (Em-
phasis added.)
68. In providing for the division between policyholders and the company, Congress
adopted a "personalized" approach reflecting the individual requirements of each company.
Of necessity, compliance with this fundamental policy means, and results in, a more
complex statutory formula for what may briefly be called the "reserve deduction."
As focused upon wholly tax-exempt interest, the law contemplates mainly two steps
designed to implement the partition. The first step is to compute the policyholders' share
of "each and every item of investment yield" (a term which includes tax-exempt interest).
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ing it gently at one end. All the noisy dispute over a "cut" in the reserve
deduction is now a matter of the past. The deduction has been promoted to
the rank of a full-fledged exclusion, and it is granted with no strings attached.
On the contrary, in giving the deduction, now exclusion, its effect on both
the company and the policyholders as a group, the law displays an extra-
ordinary degree of thoroughness. The policyholders' share is not merely a
portion, say 70 per cent, of the aggregate, in terms of dollars and cents. With
an emphasis and redundance quite unusual in statutory language, the Act
grants to the policyholders a "share of each and every item of investment yield
(including tax-exempt interest ...")."9 This piece of nuclear physics, sub-
jecting "each and every item" to an imaginary fission-like split into a policy-
holders' and a company's share, is considerably more than a startling technical
innovation. It is the unequivocal denial of the companies' claim to the full ex-
eniption of their tax-free interest. The magnanimous gesture of charging them
with only a 30 per cent "share" of the earnings, coupled with the merciless
fission of "each and every" item, logically enough bars them from claiming
more than their 30 per cent "share" of the statutory interest exemption.
In terms of dollars-leaving aside the legal analysis-this means a reaffirm-
ance of the status quo. Using our illustration, the House version would have
given the company the full $20 exemption for tax-free interest, but would have
reduced the reserve deduction from $70 to $56, leaving the company with a
taxable income of $24. As enacted the 1959 Act gives the company, instead,
the full exclusion of $70, but reduces the interest exemption to 30 per cent of
$20, or $6, resulting in a taxable income of, once again, $100 minus $76, or
$24.
This third variation of Pattern C thereby maintains the continuity even with
the more remote past, the formula of 1942, the prototype of the second varia-
tion of the same pattern.70 Words and theories have changed, and so have
The policyholders' share generally is the percentage obtained by dividing the policy and
other contract liability requirements by the investment yield. See text accompanying notes
33-37 supra.
Depending on the relationship between a company's actual investment yield and the
amount necessary to maintain the reserves, elements which will vary from company to
company and from year to year, the policyholders' share will absorb a more or less sub-
stantial part of the investment yield. The Code itself anticipates that it may amount to
as much as 100%-wherever the policy requirements exceed the actual investment yield
of a company. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 804(a) (1). The discussions before the Senate
Committee speak of 70 and 75% of net investment earnings as a likely average. Hearings
at 49, 309.
The policyholders' share, so computed is then excluded from the taxable investment
income of the company. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 804(a) (1).
The second step is to add up the company's shares of each item of investment yield-
the balance remaining after the exclusion of the policyholders' shares-and to reduce the
sum by the company's share of the fully tax-exempt interest (and of other items not
here pertinent). INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 804(a) (2).
69. INT. RIv. CODE OF 1954, § 804(a) (1), as amended, 73 Stat. 115 (1959),
70. See text at note 47 supra.
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the battle line and the battlefield, which remain to be surveyed. Yet, looking
at the purse effect only, it is as the sceptical French never tire to remark: "Plus
a change, plus c'est la mime chose !"
TESTING THE NEW LAW
Legislation With a Postscript
Facing the severe amputation of their interest exemption under the 1959
Act, those companies with a substantial stake in tax exempts 71 may seek
refuge in the one manifestation of Congress which on its face would seem to
respond to the companies' fervent prayers in the pre-enactment stage-a
thoroughly enigmatic postscript to the elaborate technical pattern. It reads:
If it is established in any case that the application of the definition of
taxable investment income contained in paragraph (2) results in the
imposition of tax on-
(A) any interest which under section 103 is excluded from gross
income,
adjustment shall be made to the extent necessary to prevent such
imposition.72
Some companies like to take a highly optimistic view of this mysterious
postscript. Perhaps they find some encouragement in the Finance Committee's
Report: "In addition, your committee's bill by a special proviso makes it clear
that in no case is any tax to be imposed on tax-exempt interest . . . 73
To these companies nothing would appear to result as evidently in the im-
position of a tax on tax-exempt interest as the unequivocal and unconcealed
denial to the companies of the exemption allocable to the policyholders'
"share."
Tactfully refraining from too close an examination of a gift horse, the com-
panies are inclined to overlook the extremely limited scope of what they like
to consider as a kind of magna charta guaranteeing their vested rights. The
71. The life insurance fraternity is as divided in its attitude to the 1959 Act as it was
when National Life challenged the 1921 Act, and won. The "loyalists" who, represented
by the later Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes, sided with the government under the 1921
Act as amici curiae included many of the giants who endorsed H.R. 4245 when Senator
Byrd introduced it on the floor of the Senate, see 105 CONG. REC. 8400-02 (1959) (Senator
Byrd's explanatory statement of May 19, 1959). Whether that impressive group has,
in addition to more enlightened public relation departments, also better prophets in its
legal departments than the "rebels," remains to be seen.
72. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 804(a) (6), as amended, 73 Stat. 116 (1959) (italics
added). See also INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 809(b) (4). The only point in this ambiguous
postscript amplified by the Proposed Treasury Regulations is the phrase "if it is established
in any case." The regulation reads, "If it is established ...to the satisfaction of the
Commissioner, or by a determination of the Tax Court of the United States, or of
any other court of competent jurisdiction, which has become final, that the application
." Treas. Reg. § 1.804-2(e) (1), 25 Fed. Reg. 7990 (Aug. 18, 1960).
73, S, PZEi, No. 291, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1959).
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Finance Committee Report calls the postscript a "special proviso." The act
itself is more to the point in calling it an "exception."74 Both designations
are ample warning that this is not the proper platform on which to challenge
anything as basic and generally applicable as the recognition, in form as well
as in substance, of the policyholders as investors. To those who do not believe
in mere headings, there is an equally perturbing caveat in the introductory
"if it is established in any case .. . ." The "exception" is as deliberately vague
about the conditions under which it may be invoked as it is with respect to the
method of corrective action. Nevertheless, the phraseology points to the peculi-
arities of applying the formula to the taxpayer's particular case, as distin-
guished from an attack on fundamental principles which form one of the most
significant innovations of the 1959 Act, applicable with equal force to all tax-
payers in a similar position.
Nor is it the proviso's function to salvage the remainder of the Act, by
means of a built-in correction, should a court object to the new definition of
taxable investment income and its "confiscation" of the exemption to the extent
of our hypothetical 70 per cent. There is a perfectly adequate separability
clause in section 7852(a) of the Code.
If more were needed to expose the largely decorative purpose of the "special
proviso," it might be suggested to take a closer look at what a taxpayer is
allowed to "establish," in order to assert a claim for corrective adjustment.
The company would have to establish that in its case the application of the
"taxable investment income" definition "results in the imposition of tax on"
tax-exempt income.
There is a distinctly diabolic touch to this requirement. In turning its face
to Congress, the proviso seems obsequiously to say: "Everything is in accord-
ance with your wishes, gentlemen. Nobody is being hurt. Municipals are ex-
empt, and to make assurance double sure, we will give satisfaction to any
taxpayer proving that his municipals are being taxed." This diplomatic ob-
jective being accomplished and reassuringly echoed by the Report, as quoted
above, the proviso turns to the taxpayer in a more pugnacious mood:
"Now you show us, if you can, how your municipals are being taxed. Seventy
per cent of the interest belongs to the policyholders, who are taxpayers strictly
honoris causa, since they pay no current taxes on it anyhow and for all the
law provides may never have to pay a tax on that money. Thirty per cent is
yours and that is specifically freed from tax. How much more than one
hundred per cent exemption on that interest do you expect us to allow ?" The
paraphrase, while not anticipated by Congressmen untrained in the interpreta-
tion of oracles, is, of course, unanswerable. No tax is being imposed on tax-
exempt interest, if it is true that 70 per cent of the interest does not belong
to the companies.
Whether the law properly and validly treats the policyholders as the re-
cipients of 70 per cent of the investment income, or whether it thereby indulges
74. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, §§ 804(a) (6), 809(b) (4), as amended, 73 Stat. 115, 121
(1959).
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in a fiction much like the communists' claim that in Russia the factories belong
to the workers-that key question is clearly beyond the ken of the "special
proviso." It is not to be answered by establishing the facts of any one indi-
vidual case, but a challenge to the validity of the law in general.
The companies can attack the statute, therefore, only by challenging the
authority of Congress to ascribe 70 per cent of investment income to the
policyholders. If they succeed, they have shown that 70 per cent of their
tax-exempt interest has not been given the statutory tax exemption. In this
event, counsel for the Treasury will be powerless to defend the statute. He
cannot request the court to reexamine the constitutional doctrine of tax-exempt
interest, for whether or not the Constitution requires an exemption for
municipal bond interest, Congress in the legislative history and in the post-
script itself has made abundantly clear its desire to preserve that exemption
as a matter of legislative policy.75 Thus the court would be faced with a self-
contradictory statute. If the court believes that the 70 per cent of investment
income cannot be allocated to the policyholders, it must ignore either the statu-
tory apportionment or the congressional intent to respect the interest exemption.
This dilemma is reminiscent of the classic case in which a donor made what he
deemed to be a tax-exempt gift, but declared his gift to be revoked if the courts
should hold it taxable-a kind of trifling with the judicial process for which
the court in that case showed little liking.76
Debtor or Conduit
Given an abundantly documented congressional promise of an unabridged
municipal-interest exemption, and finding themselves left with a statutory ex-
emption for only, say, 30 per cent of that interest, the companies will wish to
take a closer look at the technique of this amazing vanishing act. The arith-
metics of the Treasury's case alone appear to be adequate reason for invoking
75. Under these circumstances, the courts are not confronted with the present validity
of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), rev'd and remanded on
rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), which treated a tax on bond interest as a tax on the bond,
a theory declared to be no longer tenable after Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306
U.S. 466 (1939), overruling Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall) 113 (1870). Nor is it
material whether the immunity principle, once it is applicable, applies absolutely, Indian
Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931) ; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), or only where the interference with the state function is shown
to be actual and substantial, not purely conjectural, Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405,
rehearing denied, 305 U.S. 669 (1938). For the possible effect of the public salary cases
on the constitutional protection of state bond interest, see e.g., Knollenberg, Book Review
of THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMMUNITY OF STATE AND MUNICIPAL SEcuRiTIEs, 49 YALE L.J.
158 (1939).
As was said in Estate of Alexander J. Shamberg, 3 T.C. 131 (1941), aff'd, 144 F.2d
998 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792 (1945), there is no need for passing upon
the doctrine of intergovernmental immunities until Congress sees fit to remove the pro-
tection afforded by the statute.




National Life and Missouri ex rel. Missouri Ins. Co. v. Gehner. Since the
result is invariably the same Medium figure of $24, whether a full reserve
deduction ($70) is added to a mere $6 as tax-exempt interest (as in the 1959
Act), or whether a full interest exemption ($20) is added to a mere $56
reserve deduction, it is obvious that the 1959 Act consciously and deliberately
rejects the Minimum figure of $10 called for under the Supreme Court's
decisions. The Treasury might wish to argue that in National Life the Court
struck down only an insidious and ill-concealed attempt to nullify the interest
exemption by clipping the reserve deduction, whereas the 1959 Act allows the
full reserve deduction and is quite candid about the decimated interest ex-
emption. Yet it is clear that the Supreme Court did not intend to sit in judg-
ment over a question of legislative ethics alone. It emphasized the realities,
the mathematical result, and must therefore be understood to have ruled out
any merger whatever of the two immunities, no matter which is being assigned
the role of the survivor. And if moralities must enter into the picture, both
decisions amply reflect judicial indignation at any overly ingenious method
of calculation or drafting.
The companies' point of departure therefore rests on solid ground. It is
further strengthened by the fact that under any aspect of property law the
companies hold undisputed title to the bonds, collect the interest thereon
without any duty to account, and as a matter of finances are the persons whom
the borrowing states or municipalities must regard as the lenders. While it
is true that the companies must give the policyholders their "due," the credit
to reserves set aside for policyholders should, at worst, be treated as a form
of spending or applying the companies' own income, a kind of interest, a ful-
filment of the "interest" guarantee worked into the premium. If interest
deductions are allowed other taxpayers, 77 such as banks or industrial corpora-
tions, without cutting into the exemption which they enjoy by reason of
holding state or municipal securities, there is no reason for discriminating
against life insurance companies merely because their "interest" deduction is
being recognized in the particular form of a reserve deduction (exclusion).
That form merely eliminates the theoretical question whether there can be an
"interest" deduction where really there is no "indebtedness," for want of ma-
turity of the policy.78 In any event, the companies' commitment to the policy-
77. The allowance of an interest deduction-there is no statutory question of disallow-
ing the exemption of state or muncipal bond interest-is denied only if the indebtedness
was incurred or continued to purchase or carry exempt obligations. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 265. An investment resulting from the sale of a policy or a commitment to build
up a policy reserve is by its nature, motive and business purpose outside this disqualified
category.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 818(f), an accounting provision of old standing, precludes
the deduction of the same item more than once. An item going out as accrued "interest"
on the book reserve of a policy can hardly be identical with an item coming in as interest
on the company's investments-unless the company is not merely a "financial institution,"
but a pipeline.
78. Duffy v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 272 U.S. 613 (1926); see Penn Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 962-67 (3d Cir. 1937); Commissioner v. Pan-
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holders is at most an obligation to credit the policyholders with a certain
amount in terms of dollars, not to pass on to them a proportional amount of
every item of investment income earned by the company. The commitment
is not in the nature of a mortgage on, or pledge of, company earnings-it
would exist even if a company decided not to invest at all-and therefore it
takes nothing away from the companies' unquestioned right to the bond
interest.
The equities of the companies' grievance are prima facie impressive. The
opportunity for asserting them in judicial proceedings, however, is extremely
restricted. The legislator is no longer in the process of deliberating policy.
He has devoted much time to that phase and has now spoken his final, "I will
it." Thus, except for the very limited scope of the nebulous "postscript," 79
the companies' attack must proceed from "dehors the instrument," so to
speak.
The reduction of the interest exemption from 100 to 30 per cent or less is
not a matter of statutory construction or misconstruction. It is a deliberate
decision of Congress. Had Congress done nothing more than to announce
this decision, maybe it would have done nothing more than to invite a re-
examination of National Life and the Missouri Ins. Co. case renouncing in
advance any benefit to be derived from the present punctured condition of
the intergovernmental immunities doctrine which was the backdrop for those
decisions. The question before the Court then would call merely for a deter-
mination whether applying the reserve deduction to the interest exemption
was just as objectionable as applying the interest exemption to the reserve
deduction-the mathematical result being the same, on this occasion the pas-
sage of some 30 eventful years of tax administration might or might not give
the Supreme Court pause to reconsider the intrinsic merits of the precedents
and the present-day validity of their message, highly controversial as they
have been from the very day of their promulgation.
Yet, put on notice by the extensive hearings before the Senate Finance
Committee, Congress was determined not to expose itself to a mere revival
of National Life and its unhappy ending. It took the unusual precaution of
incorporating into the law what ordinarily it might have left to the skill of
counsel to detect and expound-its motives and line of reasoning. It wrote a
brief justifying the trimming of the interest exemption, but it endowed it with
the weight and authority of a duly enacted law. For income tax purposes, it
made of the life insurance company a personality split between acting for
others and acting for itself, a kind of conduit, if not fiduciary, for most of its
earnings. Rather than denying a share of the exemption because of duplicate
Am. Life Ins. Co., 111 F.2d 366 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 311 U.S. 272 (1940); Equitable Life
Ass'n Soc'y v. Helvering, 137 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1943), aff'd, 321 U.S. 560 (1944) ; New
England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Welch, 153 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1946).
79. The proviso may have some application to a foreign life insurance company invest-
ing in bonds issued by American states or muncipalities. See Manufacturers Life Ins. Co.,
32 F. Supp. 284 (1940), 43 BTA 867 (1941).
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benefits, Congress has denied 70 per cent of the interest exemption because
70 per cent of that income does not belong to the companies."
This theory is more than the "ingenuity in calculation" or "form of word"
for which the Supreme Court displayed aversion in National Life.s0 Congress
enacted the 1959 Act based upon a new and previously untested premise-
the conduit theory. Since this rationale is backed by the force of law, the com-
panies must wrestle with the Act as it is written, and this involves the for-
midable task of demonstrating that the conduit theory is not merely inaccurate
or unwise, but arbitrary, whimsical, despotic, or at least a discriminatory form
of classification.8 '
This burden is neither met nor obviated by the assertion that the exemption
belongs to the company in full as of right because it cannot be divorced from
the legal ownership of the bonds and the uncontested right to collect the
interest. The law takes, and always has taken, a different view. Long before
any doubt was cast on the sanctity of intergovernmental immunities, courts
have faced a variety of situations involving the need for a distinction between
the "right" and the "wrong" person to claim the exemption. The exemption
is a commitment to the state governments, of which commitment, whether con-
stitutional or statutory, the taxpayer is but the "tertius gaudens," the third-
party beneficiary. Who the proper taxpayer is, is a question of federal tax
law which is not a part of the commitment. In individual borderline cases-
pledged securities, repurchase options, securities transferred to a trust which
in turn issues interest-bearing participating certificates-the courts have de-
termined the question of qualification, generally on the basis of the parties'
intentions, beneficial interest, and the economic purpose of the transaction,
rather than legal title.82 There is no reason for denying the same authority to
Congress for such typical situations as it deems a proper subject of more
general legislation, provided it exercises its power within the limits of reason.
The Internal Revenue Code, in its general provision of section 103, says
nothing about the person entitled to the claim for exemption. In this respect
it is more reticent than on other "items specifically excluded from gross in-
come," 8 3 such as gifts, inheritances, death benefits under life policies, where
the addition of the words "received" or "acquired" gives at least a more
specific indication of the taxpayer eligible for the benefit. While this silence
seems to reflect a kind of neutral "to whom it may concern" attitude, the
80. See National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 508, 519 (1928) ; Missouri
ex rel. Missouri Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 281 U.S. 313, 321 (1930).
81. For a detailed discussion of the constitutional limitations upon the taxing power
of Congress, see 1 MERTENS § 4.09.
82. Carson Estate Co., 31 BTA 607 (1934), aff'd per curiam, 80 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir.
1936); Bess Schoellkopf, 32 ETA 88 (1935), taxpayer's appeal to CCA-5 dismissed,
August 25, 1936; Norfolk Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1933) ; First
Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 57 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1932), afflrming 19 BTA 744, 750
(1930), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 636 (1932); Commissioner v. The Bank of Cal., 80 F.2d
389 (9th Cir. 1935), affirming 30 BTA 556 (1934); G.C.M. 12355, CB XII-2,100.
83. Title of Subchapter B, Part III, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954.
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context, that is, the close connection with other exclusions, leaves no doubt
about the taxpayer who qualifies. There can be no exclusion of income, unless
without it there would have been an inclusion, and, subject to the exclusions
granted by law, a taxpayer is accountable for "all income from whatever source
derived."8 4
It is at this point that the 1959 Act intervenes. Under the heading "ex-
clusion of policyholders' share of investment yield" the Act implies that a
certain percentage of the company's investment income (including tax-free
interest) is chargeable to the policyholders, and therefore "shall not be in-
cluded" in the company's taxable investment income.85 It aligns itself with
the long list of other exceptions to the principle of section 61.
Congress is of course limited in awarding the exemption by the constitutional
requirement that it refrain from acting arbitrarily or unreasonably. For example,
it may be arbitrary and unreasonable to provide that if an individual taxpayer
invests his savings in municipal bonds, the exemption should be given not to
him but to his grandmother. Yet suppose a taxpayer had received bonds from
his grandmother as a gift, with the understanding that she receive periodically
70 per cent of the interest earned for the rest of her life. Would it be unreason-
able and arbitrary for the law to split the exemption 70-30 between the two?
Or would it become unreasonable if, under otherwise similar circumstances
the bonds had been bought by the taxpayer on his own initiative in investing
or reinvesting funds received from grandmother in cash? Could the party
most directly interested, the municipality-if it were in a position to be heard
-allege an impairment of its borrowing power by reason of the split, whether
or not, on some personal ground, grandmother was exempt from federal tax
and, therefore, the interest exemption wasted on her?
The classification of policyholders as income recipients (and thereby recipi-
ents of the tax-exempt interest) must undergo the same test of reason. If
this is a reasonably possible classification, it is irrelevant whether it is, by
scientific standards, right or wrong. And it is beyond the competence of courts
to decide whether it is good or bad as a matter of legislative policy.
For decades Congress has underwritten the states' regulatory and elaborate-
ly enforced requirement of a systematic build-up of actuarially needed life
insurance reserves. The reserve deduction and allowances of similar effect,
designed to implement this policy, were the federal government's recognition
of the special needs of the life insurance industry as a separate group of tax-
payers. These needs were determined by the companies' operation under state
control as media for the pooling and investment of money contributed by the
policyholders, as actuarially required with a view to the systematic accumula-
tion of the funds necessary for their mutual insurance. Investment is an in-
dispensable element of that function, but to the extent to which it serves to
strengthen the reserves, it is insurancewise the undertaking of the policy-
84. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a).
85. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 804(a) (1), as amended, 73 Stat. 115 (1959).
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holders as a group. The legal form of insurance is a contractual obligation
of the company to the individual policyholder, and if this aspect were applied
to the prematurity stage it would tend to bespeak a mere debtor-creditor re-
lationship between the company and its policyholders with regard to the
process of setting aside the requisite dollar amount as additions to reserve.
The economic essence, however, as reflected in the computation of premiums
and the state-supervised formation of reserves, is a joint venture of the largest
possible number of participants. It is these participants, the policyholders, who
bear the true and ultimate insurance risk. "For it must always be kept in mind
that insurance losses are paid by the policyholders themselves and by no one
else."8 It is for their benefit as mutual insurers that the state maintains close
surveillance, checking not only on the accounting to reflect the growth of
the future liability to the policyholder, but also on the actual presence of the
assets necessary, as of any time, to meet it. It is for their benefit, also, that
Congress abstains from taxing the investment earnings on the reserves.
If under most favorable circumstances no less than 70 per cent, and in a
less auspicious climate as much as 100 per cent, of the company's investment
earnings are needed for legally required additions to reserves for policyholders,
and if more than 82 per cent of the vaunted $107 billion in total assets of
United States life insurance companies represent aggregate policy reserves,87
there is, as a matter of economics and therefore of tax law, definite room for
the question: Whose business is it? Who is the principal?
The 86th Congress did not like the noncommittal answer of prior legislation
which was interested only in limiting the amount of the reserve deduction,
but as to its nature permitted the inference that it was a kind of business ex-
pense, or interest on borrowed funds, in any event nothing more than a mone-
tary obligation of the company. Instead, it attributed to the company a
fiduciary-like status vis-a-vis the policyholders, a legal duty to pass on to them
the very earnings on their contributions.
This view is in line with the thinking of judicial, tax, and insurance authori-
ties throughout the past few decades. What appears at first blush as a legis-
lative innovation derives its true value and significance from the fact that it
restores the contact with a past that has given the problem a more imaginative
and penetrating analysis than has characterized the tentative and stopgap legis-
lation of our days.
As early as 1920 the Supreme Court pointed to the policyholders as the
true principals and to the company's services rendered to them as a group of
"ccooperators" :
[T]he service performed in level-premium life insurance is both pro-
tection and investment. Premiums paid ... have earned so much for
the cooperators, that the company is able to pay to each not only the
agreed amount but also additional sums called dividends; and have earned
86. Bell, Federal Taxation of Insurance Companies, 3 TAx Rzvisio COMPENDIUM
2055, 2056 (1959).
87. LIrFE INsTRAwcE FACr BOOK 1959, at 61-64.
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these additional sums, in part at least, by transactions not among mem-
bers, but with others; as by lending the money of the cooperators to third
persons .... 8
Quite similar language was used by Judge Learned Hand in a capital stock
tax case which arose under the Revenue Act of 1918 and permitted an in-
formative glance at that of 1916:
The policy holders are therefore at once associates in the business of
life insurance, as to which they are investors, and creditors of the group
as a whole.
For it is possible to regard the policy holders even of a stock company
as also associates in the enterprise, and perhaps that is the juster view.
The law of 1916 taxed only stock insurance companies, and excluded
from capital "such deposits and reserve funds as they are required by
law or contract to maintain or hold for the protection of or payment to
or apportionment among policy holders." Rev. Act of 1916, § 407 (39
Stat. 789). It apparently presupposed that policies were not liabilities,
though it did not say so.
The profits do not even come altogether from premiums; in part at
any rate they result from the financial operations of the whole group,
which thus makes profits or losses as such.89
With all due respect for the great judge's artistic penchants, this is not a
poet's allegoric fantasy, but a thoroughly prosaic appraisal of the life insurance
business in the light of a law which was not half as explicit and forceful in
stressing the role of the policyholders as a group as the Act of 1959.
Subsequent legislation introduced the reserve "deduction" in recognition
of the amounts set aside for reserve. The term "deduction," addressing itself
primarily to the arithmetical result, is of little assistance when the problem
is the intrinsic nature of the allowance. It covers such exclusionary items as
a life insurance company's exemption of municipal or state bond interest and
typical "passing-through" of income in kind, as in the case of a trust's distribu-
tions deductions. In the former sense, the term might support the companies'
theory of allowing for an expense-like 90 outgo inevitably connected with their
business but not affecting their beneficial interest in all their investment earn-
ings. In the latter sense the term would connote a routing of earnings to those
for whom they have been produced and collected. It is interesting to note that
where courts have felt the need for closer analysis-it is one of the weaknesses
of National Life that it did not recognize such a need despite the government's
argument: "No complaint may fairly be made because the statute does not
permit petitioner to deduct the same income twice" 1 -they have identified
the reserve deduction as a deduction not for an item of expense or "interest,"
but for income which they have collected only to pass on again. For example,
88. Penn Mut. Co. v. Lederer, 252 U.S. 523, 534 (1920). (Emphasis added.)
89. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 39 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1930), aff'd, 283 U.S.
242 (1931). (Emphasis added.)
90. See McClatchey, .supra note 33 ("expense requirement").
91. National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 508, 515 (1928).
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Judge Disney of the Tax Court concludes: "It thus appears that the 334 per
cent deduction based upon the mean of reserves is an attempt to render tax-free
an amount sufficient to cover the amount of income which must actually go into
policy reserves under the state statutes governing insurance companies.
92
Outside the tax field, and free from the terminological impediment of a
particular statute, the authorities are even more emphatic in centering their
attention on the direct relationship between the reserve and the policyholders
as a group. "Individual policyholders living in many different states who own
policies in a single company have their separate interests blended in one
assembled fund of assets upon which all are equally dependent for payment
of their policies."
93
Leading texts in the insurance field speak of the life insurance reserve as
"funds which are in their nature trust funds,"94 or a fund which "does not
belong to the company but is held in trust for the policyholder at an assumed
rate of interest." 95
None of these utterances, it should be noted, purports to deal specifically
with the treatment of tax-exempt interest. Each has its own reason to search
for the key to the puzzling problem of properly classifying one of the most
remarkable inventions of the human mind. And considering how much the
industry owes to the creative thinking of the insurance expert, mathematicians,
and even astronomers, and how little to the lawyer, who has always remained
on the defensive in this field, it is particularly striking that it is the student of
insurance who applies the strongest term for a fiduciary relationship, the word
"trust."
A consensus of this weight and variety of perspectives is not readily dis-
carded as a theorist's pipedream. When, in addition, it is sanctioned with the
official seal of the United States, it is not overcome by a mere "see however"
reference to any school of thought which may align the policyholder with an
ordinary bank depositor. In the presence of adequate rational and historic
support for such a theory there is the necessary support for denying the
company the benefit of the interest exemption which is inseparably attached
to the burden of accountability for income.9 6 Moreover, there can be no
92. Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co., 4 T.C. 732, 738 (1945). (Emphasis added.) See also
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 74 Ct. Cf. 162, 56 F.2d 897 (1932).
See generally MERTENS § 36.11 (1934 ed.); id. § 44.28 (1942 & 1957 ed.).
The verbal variations are numerous. Thus, Commissioner v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
65 F.2d 347, 349 (2d Cir. 1933), considers the sum deductible as additions to reserve as
"not received as taxable income."
93. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 541 (1944).
(Emphasis added.) While referring to fire insurance, the passage applies a fortiori to
life insurance.
94. MACLEAN 265. (Emphasis added.)
95. HUE NER & BLACK 6. (Emphasis added.)
96. The same logic is applied to the trustee of an ordinary trust. He is not discharged
of taxwise responsibility merely by reason of his setting aside and accumulating income
for the beneficiary. In this respect less is being required of a life insurance company. But
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quarrel with the "each and every item" method of apportionment, since, if a
partition is to be made at all, there could be no method more equitable and
less discriminatory than "across the board" approach, the same as the Code,
by the so-called character rule, provides for the comparable problem of a trust
or estate.
97
The fact that policyholders do not pay current taxes upon "their" share of
the investment earnings, and thereby make no use of the attached interest ex-
emption, should not obscure the issue. Sooner or later, when the present shelter
for tax-free reserve accumulation is being removed, the need for joining the
good with the bad will become more evident. For the time being, however,
exemption wasted should not be confused with exemption denied.
Coda
The controversy over the tax-exempt interest collected by life insurance
companies is but a revised edition of the old problem of "duplication of bene-
fits" which has plagued Congress since the Revenue Act of 1921. It has now
become a battle of the fictions. Since in the legal field a fiction rises in value
with its proximity to, not with its distance from, realities, and since Congress
enjoys a privileged position in the creation and application of legal fictions, the
revival of the ancient tax-exempt interest controversy with the benefit of
modernized and more efficient legal weapons may well have an outcome vastly
different from the National Life verdict of 1928.
Such an outcome could have more profound repercussions than were antici-
pated by the companies which voiced their objections to the reduction of their
reserve deduction under the House bill. Once there is a "policyholders' share"
on the books, and its validity is judicially recognized, there is a tempting
object for a new tax. If it is not yet being exploited, the credit will not be
due to the companies which so inflexibly insisted on their ounce of flesh. Per-
haps right should not yield to might. Yet at times it does well to yield to plain
good business.
once he is "discharged" by reason of required or authorized actual distribution, the benefit
of the interest exemption is pro-rata lost to him and moves to the beneficiary. The
beneficiary may or may not have sufficient income to derive an actual benefit from the
exemption of interest. It is definitely not a part of the federal commitment to the states
with regard to their borrowing power to keep the federal taxes high enough to make
the interest exemption attractive.
97. INT. Rzv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 652(b), 662(b).
